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Abstract 
A huge amount of everyday life situations suggests that dishonest acts as cheating or 
lying occur frequently. Researchers developed several methods to investigate how and 
when cheating behaviors occur, such as the under the cup dice task paradigm. Also, 
several findings explain how possible gains or losses influence dishonest behavior. We 
hypothesized that people are willing to adopt cheating behaviors to get a desired outcome 
within the outcome uncertainty and that two mechanism, extrinsic attribution and 
uncertainty avoidance played a significant role within outcome uncertainty. The 
activation of one mechanism rather than another interacted with the situational frame 
(gain frame vs loss frame). We created a probabilistic version of under the cup dice task 
paradigm. Results provide that no uncertainty avoidance played a significant role within 
outcome uncertainty, while extrinsic attribution played a slightly significant role in the 
gain frame. Suggestions for further research as well as limitations are discussed. 
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(Dis)honesty under payoff uncertainty 
 
A huge amount of everyday life situations suggests that dishonest acts as cheating or 
lying occur frequently. The clear majority of experimental studies that detected cheating 
behaviors is based on the certainty of benefits gained adopting unethical behaviors. But 
what happens when a lie can lead either to a convenient outcome or no results at all? 
Moreover, if the context is framed, will the frame influence the behavior? How? 
Why people behave dishonestly? 
 According to the Standard Economic Model of Rational and Selfish Human Behavior, 
when people drawn the line to decide whether lie or not, they usually take into account 
three aspects: how many advantages they are about to gain acting dishonestly, the 
likelihood of being discovered and the magnitude of sanctions if caught. The Standard 
Economic perspective describes the Homo Economicus in terms of a rational individual, 
who tend to maximize his own income. This individual knows exactly what he wants 
and what he does not want and the decision to be honest or not it is clearly drawn. In 
other words, people choose to act honestly accordingly to an evaluation of cost-befits of 
their actions which leads to optimize their interests (Hechter 1990; Lewicki 1984) 
 To extend the Standard Economic Model of Rational and Selfish Human Behavior, 
more attention was focused on the role of individual differences in acting dishonestly. 
Lewis (2009) argued that individual differences could be described as the interaction of 
three levels: the individual level where individuals tend to maximize their profits and 
personal utilities defined as a personal characteristic, how people are socialized and how 
people differ in cultural norms.  
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Personal characteristics, socialization and cultural norms 
 Thomas Gabor (1994) documented the spread immorality of honest people, breaking 
down the stereotype that only criminal people violate the rules and the law. One way 
which is common in both criminal and honest people is that both create a distance 
between themselves and their behaviors. This mechanism is defined as moral 
disengagement.  
Regarding the role of socialization, people within a permissive environment tend to 
manifest higher rates of dishonest behaviors. (e.g., Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Gino & 
Pierce, 2009a; Mazar et al., 2008). In an experiment, Mazar et al. (2005) showed how 
making morality salient significantly reduced dishonest behaviors. Specifically, they 
made morality salient manipulating the levels of self-awareness, a manipulation that is 
highly associated with honesty. In this, they involved participants in a recall task. 
Results showed that when the ethical standards are made salient, people pay more 
attention on their own standards and rigidity toward their violation is higher. 
Regarding the role of the culture, it could affect how individual perceive dishonesty in 
two ways: by normalizing dishonesty in a specific context and/or by influencing the 
individual general tendencies towards dishonest acts. For instance, corruption influence 
significantly the context- specific dishonesty (Fisman & Miguel, 2007). This result was 
confirmed in a cross-cultural study developed by Mann et. al (2016).  
The role of justification 
It seems reasonable to say that people need to balance their needs, maximize their 
incomes through dishonest act and maintain a positive self-concept (Mazar, Amir and 
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Ariely, 2008).  In the Self- Concept Maintenance Theory, Mazar et al. (2008) observed 
that people behave dishonestly enough to profit, but honestly enough to elude a negative 
evaluation of the self. Incomplete cheating seems to be the balance point between the 
external rewards offered acting dishonestly and the maintenance of their positive self- 
image. 
In line with this statement, interesting results were found in a study conduct within a 
financial firm. The banking industry is well known for promoting a business culture 
which is tolerant toward dishonest behaviors instead of forbidding them. Cohn, Fehr and 
Maréchal (2014) recruited 128 employees from a large firm to test whether their 
professional identity was associated to higher rates of cheating behaviors. All subjects 
performed a coin tossing task, which has been indicated as one of the most reliable 
measures to detect cheating behaviors outside of an experimental setting. Participants 
were asked to toss a coin ten times and report each outcome online. Depending on the 
outcome (head or tail) they could win up to 20$. Subjects were already aware whether 
head or tail were linked to the money prize gain. They framed the competitive nature of 
the bank business culture saying to each subject that they will be paid only if they reach 
a number of successful outcome equal or higher than the ones reach from an online 
survey. The coin toss task was performed without any supervision and each participant 
could win a maximum amount of 200$. Results showed that participants who were 
primed with their professional identity showed higher rates of cheating behaviors. 
Nevertheless, a significantly portion of liars did not fully cheated, reporting 6, 7 and 8 
successful coin flips rather than 9 or 10. So then, participants do not take the fully 
advantage provided by anonymity to maintain their honest self-image.  
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Another way of lying and maintain a positive self-concept is to find justification for 
lying. 
Kunda (1990) provided evidence that explained how people get easily to the conclusion 
they want to when justifications are available or providing justifications by themselves.  
This thesis is supported by Shalvi and al. (2011), who asserted that people change their 
perception of what is acceptable and what is not acceptable according with the amount 
self-justification available for doing it. Specifically, they used a die roll paradigm in 
which only the participants knew their die roll outcome and gain money accordingly 
with the number they specified. Specifically, to the experimental group participants 
were told to roll the dice three times and report the first roll die outcome while to the 
control group participants were told to roll the die one time and report the outcome. 
Results indicated a significantly higher amount of cheating behaviors in the 
experimental condition. So then, the more justification they had, the greater the extent to 
lie on the die roll outcome to gain more money.  
The coin toss task and the die under the cup task were considered extremely suitable to 
investigate real-life dishonest behaviors in according with two reasons: firstly, they have 
high levels of construct validity and could be easily explained, and secondly, each 
subject is provided with complete anonymity. 
 In fact, in studies that adopted the dice under the cup paradigm (Shalvi et al., 2011), 
participants secretly roll a dice and are paid accordingly to what they reported. 
Consequently, if participants report a six, they will receive six euros for guarantee. 
Moreover, in accord to the Self-Concept Maintenance Theory (Mazar et al.,2008.), 
people limit their unethical behaviors avoiding major lies to maximize their outcome 
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while maintaining an honest self-concept through justifications for lying (Kunda, 1990; 
Ariely, 2012). So then, if they roll a two, reporting a 5 is conceived as more honest than 
reporting a six, and to justify themselves they could say that everyone else would have 
done the same in that situation.  
 But what happens if cheating does not assure a secure benefit? There are a lot of 
everyday life situation in which one lies even though his/her unethical act would not 
produce a secure outcome. If he/she adopt cheating behaviors is simply to increase the 
likelihood to get the most valued outcome. 
In our study, our aim was to investigate whether people are more likely to adopt 
cheating behaviors to increase the likelihood to get the most valued outcome adopting a 
probabilistic cheating paradigm. 
 Probabilistic setting, uncertainty avoidance and extrinsic attribution  
Since we wanted to highlight how adopting cheating behavior increases the likelihood to 
get the desired outcome within an uncertain context, we used a different version of the 
dice under the cup paradigm. We stated that after the dice-roll, a cash amount of 6 Euros 
could be obtained. Then, we introduced a new element, which was not included in the 
previous versions of the under the cup dice paradigm: a ball drawn. Specifically, we 
stated that a ball should be picked blindly, out of a container filled with six balls.  
Firstly, the container should be filled with six white balls. After the dice-roll, these balls 
should be replaced with yellow balls depending on the report of the die roll. Every 
participant had to pick up randomly one ball from the container. The participant got the 
cash amount if he/she caught the yellow ball. If he/ she caught the white ball, he/she did 
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not receive the cash amount of six Euros. So then, if a participant reported a higher 
number, he/she increased the likelihood to win the cash amount.   
In line with the probabilistic cheating paradigm is the notion of uncertainty. Different 
uncertainty definitions have been provided in the literature. A broad definition states 
that the uncertainty concept included several distinct phenomena such as risk, ambiguity 
and equivocality. 
Regarding how decision makers deal with uncertainty, a procedure defined as standard 
in formal and behavioral decision theories is called the R.P.Q heuristic. This procedure 
is based on the reduction of uncertainty through the information search (Janis & Mann, 
1977), the quantification of what cannot be reduced, and the plug of the results into a 
model that includes uncertainty. The reduction of the uncertainty levels in real life 
situation is often problematic: information can be unavailable, or is too ambiguous or 
misleading (Feldman & March, 1981; Grandori, 1984; Wohlstetter, 1962) and also, 
search for further information does not lead automatically to a better decision when 
environmental uncertainty is high (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984). To deal with un 
uncertain event without any additional information source, three basic tactics were 
found: reducing uncertainty, acknowledging uncertainty and suppressing or avoiding 
uncertainty.   
The probabilistic version of the original dice-under-the cup task highlighted two more 
mechanisms: uncertainty avoidance and extrinsic attribution. 
Regarding the uncertainty avoidance, Argote (1982) and Fredrickson and Mitchell 
(1984) stated that comprehensive decision-making is adopted in relatively stable 
situation while a more flexible response is used in more complex environments.  
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Hofstede (1980), categorized the uncertainty avoidance mechanism as something that 
varies across cultures. The author defined it as “the extent to which the members of a 
culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations” (Hofstede, 1991, p.113). So 
then, the uncertainty avoidance can be conceptualized as a cultural characteristic, when 
analyzed an aggregate level (e.g., Albers-Miller & Gelb, 1996; Hofstede, 1980; Nakata 
& Sivakumar,1996). The uncertainty avoidance has never been conceptualized in terms 
of personality trait (e.g., Hui, 1988; Singelis, 1994; Triandis, 1995) but a definition at 
the individual level was provided. In fact, we can talk in terms of uncertainty avoidance 
at an individual level as the extent an individual is willing to avoid uncertainty as much 
as possible. So then, individuals with high levels of uncertainty avoidance or individuals 
who are part of a high uncertainty avoidance culture are more prone to use heuristics to 
face with uncertainty. 
In the probabilistic cheating paradigm, when people face up with an unsecure outcome, 
reporting a number smaller than six will have as main implication less probability to get 
the desired outcome. So then, to remove completely the uncertainty they will be 
motivated to report a six.  
Consequently, we firstly hypothesized that To avoid uncertainty, people will over-report 
6 to fully remove the uncertainty and under-report all the outcomes below 6.  
In the standard version of the dice-under the cup paradigm, people get a financial 
outcome accordingly to what they report. Thus, if one reports 5 after the die roll, he/ she 
will receive 5 Euros. To maintain an honest self-concept, this one could justify 
himself/herself in a variety of ways (“report a five is more honest than report a six”). In 
our version, the adoption of cheating behavior will not assure the desired outcome, 
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which is due to a random draw, but it facilitates deception. In fact, people could 
extrinsically attribute their result even though they are acting unethically (I won because 
I was lucky). 
Nevertheless, the extrinsic attribution to their outcome is not suitable to justify a good 
result which occurs frequently in a lottery. To maximize their outcome while 
maintaining an honest self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008) people prefer to adopt as 
justification an extrinsic attribution, like luck, rather than openly admitting that their 
achievement is due to an unethical act. Thus, if they report a six they cannot attribute 
their outcome to luck. Consequently, report another number is more attractive. 
Thus, we secondly hypothesized that People will under-report six because this remove 
the chance to attribute extrinsically to luck their desired outcome and will over-report 5 
or 4, increasing their chance to win yet leaving an extrinsic attribution as justification.  
The role of the frame 
The first and the second hypotheses stated two contradicting predictions: the uncertainty 
avoidance should lead to an increased number of reported 6 and the extrinsic attribution 
should lead to a lower number of reported 6. We propose that both mechanisms have a 
role, but the feature that determines the dominant one is the frame manipulation.  
The hypothesis underlying framing is that people adopt different behaviors when the 
context is positively or negatively framed: there is a general tendency for risk aversion 
behaviors within positively framed contexts and a general tendency for risk seeking 
behaviors for negatively framed problems. To define these two tendencies, the term 
framing effect is used.  Different ways can be used to manipulate framing.  We could 
talk about framing manipulation whether the frame is manipulated through explicit gain 
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or loss words (win, asset, gain, refund, loss, payment) or by task responsive words, or in 
other terms, by a labelling manipulation. An example of framing labelling manipulation 
could be a common-sense dilemma or a public-goods situation. Another kind of 
manipulation could be a task manipulation (Kuhberger, 1998). So then, a context could 
be framed through very simple changes, such as a word or a task feature (Tversky & 
Kanheman, 1981) and these changes could lead to different preferences.  
Most part of theories highlights how the adoption of a risk preference is dependable to 
the payoff amount (whether it is larger or smaller) and or the likelihood to get a desired 
outcome (Kunberg, 1997). 
In all studies involving the framing effect, the outcome is always objectively presented, 
to make losses or negative framed context looks like gains or positively framed context.   
In line with these statements, what it plays a central role in the Prospect Theory is the 
perception of gain and losses. 
According to the Prospect Theory (Khaneman and Tversky, 1979), people perceive 
differently losses and gains: a considerable amount of evidence asserted that there is 
higher risk seeking to avoid possible losses than to increase possible gains (e.g., 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In fact, a loss has a 
major influence on choices and behaviors than an equivalent gain. This asymmetry 
occurs frequently since the pain of losing something is higher than the pleasure of 
gaining it (Ariely, Huber and Wertenbroch, 2005; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; 
Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson and Gilbert, 2006; Zhang and Fishbach, 2005). Mcgraw, 
Larsen, Kahneman and Schkade (2010) discovered that participants distress levels were 
higher while they were thinking about a possible lost than the excitement levels about 
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winning the same amount of money. Further studies confirmed that whether a situation 
is characterized by both a potential loss (loss frame) and a potential gain (gain frame), 
the decision-making process results influenced.  
Thus, if a situation is framed to involve a potential gain or a potential loss, people will 
be more motivated to avoid possible losses than to approach possible gains. 
Consequently, the general idea of loss aversion is supported. A loss aversion pattern is 
observed in a great variety of context (Camerer, 2000; Hardie, Johnson and Fader, 1993; 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990; Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005; Thaler, 1985). 
In line with these statements, there is the concept of risk aversion provided for the first 
time by Daniel Bernoulli (1738), which states that the preference for a sure gain is a key 
feature of risk aversion.  
In general, selecting a sure outcome over an uncertain situation that has equal or higher 
expectation is called risk aversion, and the rejection of a sure outcome in favor of an 
uncertain situation with lower or equal expectation is defined as risk seeking. Bernoulli 
asserted that people usually evaluate the expectations in terms of the subjective values 
of these outcomes.  
Several findings explain how possible gains or losses influence dishonest behavior. Ker 
and Chugh (2009) in a hypothetical scenario showed that dishonest behavior is 
increased in the loss frame condition compare than the gain frame condition. This result 
was even higher under time pressure.  
Cameron and Miller (2008, Study 2; also cited in Cameron and Miller, 2009) found that 
when the participants could cheat (they could self-report their performance on an 
anagram task to being paid accordingly) they pointed out higher performance rates when 
13 
 
that performance was connected to a loss reduction of the ten dollars allocated compared 
to gain condition performance. To exclude that these results are due only by a higher 
effort in the loss condition, further studies examined (Grolleau, Kocher and Sutan, in 
press) the loss aversion effect on lying using a cheating paradigm performance based 
(self-reported performance of solved matrix tasks). In addition, the tasks performance 
was monitored or not. Consequently, participants could cheat in the non-monitored 
condition. In the monitored condition, there were no significant differences between the 
gain frame performance and the loss frame performance, in the non-monitored condition 
the participants cheating likelihood was higher in the loss frame than the gain frame. As 
a result, the effects were not merely due to the higher effort in the loss frame. 
Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017, E xperiment 1) tested whether the actual dishonest 
behavior was more likely to occur. Specifically, they tested it in a potential loss situation 
as well as in a potential gain scenario and they aimed to verity that dishonest behavior 
happened more frequently in a potential loss situation than the potential gain situation. 
To investigate their hypotheses, they used a dice-task paradigm providing anonymity 
(Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). The results demonstrated that people showed 
higher rates of dishonest behavior in the loss condition compared to the gain condition. 
If we consider that losses are more threatening than gains it seems reasonable to assert 
that the reduction of uncertainty is more important in the losses domain. Thus, the 
uncertainty avoidance described in the first hypothesis should be more dominant in the 
loss frame than in the gain frame.  
If we consider that people are more inclined to cheat to avoid losses, they are less in 
need to attribute their behavior extrinsically in the gain domain. Thus, the extrinsic 
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attribution described in the second hypothesis should be less dominant in the loss frame 
than the gain frame. 
So then, we expect that framing influences the cheating behavior. In other words, we 
thirdly hypothesized the moderating effect of framing: In the loss-frame people will 
over- report 6 to fully remove the uncertainty and will under-report the outcomes below 
6; in the gain-frame, people will under-report 6 because this remove the chance to 
attribute extrinsically the desired outcome to luck) and over-report 5 and maybe also 4.  
 
Method 
General background of the experiment 
To verify our hypotheses, we create a laboratory setting in which participants were 
randomly assigned to two framed conditions: the loss frame condition and the gain frame 
condition. We operationalize the uncertainty as the chance to get the money after 
performing two tasks: the dice under the cup task and a blindly ball drawn. The dice 
under the cup paradigm is a technique commonly used to investigate to what extent 
people lie (Moshagen and Hilbig, 2017 ). The strongest point of this tasks is that the 
expected value could be used as a baseline to detect honest behavior. In the most part of 
studies, the dice is rolled once and the probability of rolling a number from 1 to 6 is 1/6. 
Since the uncertainty was associated to the chance to get the money, a cash compensation 
for participating was not included. Participation were compensated with 1 credit. To 
operationalize the frame, we manipulated the money ownership. In fact, the ownership 
creates a link between the self and the good. So then, a money fee for participating was 
not included. 
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In the gain condition, participants received or not the money at the end of the experiment, 
in the loss condition, participants received the money immediately after reading the 
informed consent.  
We did not calculate a sample size to detect a medium effect. In a first place, we fixed the 
number of participants at 120 and to get a higher effect, we increased the number of 
participants to 150.  
Participants and Design 
150 participants (103 females; 47 males; Mage = 21.41, SD = 3.01, range: 18–34) were 
recruited at Leiden University in four days.. Before the beginning of the experiment, all 
participants read the informed consent. Between 1 and 8 participants arrived for each 
experimental session, and in each session, either the gain or the loss condition was 
conducted. It was necessary to assign all participants in one experimental session to the 
same experimental condition, as the informed consent forms had a slightly different 
wording, depending on condition. We switched the condition approximately every 30 
participants. Like this, participants were randomly assigned to condition.  
The full procedure took nearly 20 minutes. In reason of that dishonest behaviors are 
unlikely to occur when detection levels are high, the dice under the cup task took place in 
cubicles to provide total anonymity to each participant. 
Procedure and Frame Manipulation 
This study was advertised at Leiden University in the Pieter de La Court building as 
decision making study involving uncertain events. Recruited participants were invited to 
laboratory to read the informed consent. To manipulate the frame, we used two different 
informed consent forms (see Appendix A) and two sets of instruction (see Appendix B; 
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see Appendix C) . In the gain condition, participants read on the informed consent form 
they could win six Euro at the end of the ball drawn task. In the loss condition, they read 
on the informed consent form that they would receive six Euro immediately. In both 
informed consent forms, we stated that the chances to kept the money were upon the 
ball drawn outcome. After reading the informed consent, participants were assigned to a 
cubicle. The experimenter explained they had to do a series of tasks and when they 
started the task, the cubicle door must be closed. At the end of each task performed in 
the cubicle, they were instructed to open the door. As first task, participants assigned to 
both conditions fill in a filler questionnaire providing data regarding sex, age and the 
number of psychology experiment they participated. Furthermore, we measured their 
attitudes toward free will, locus of control, determination (scientific vs fatalism). The 
items were rated on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 (See Appendix B). When they finished to 
fill the questionnaire, participants opened the door. The experimenter took the 
questionnaire and gave to him/her a cup. On the top of the cup a hole was created. A 
legitimate dice was stacked within the cup. In addition to the cup they received an 
instruction sheet and they can choose between Dutch and English instruction sheet. In 
both gain and losses instruction sheets, the general framework of the experiment was 
explained. In the gain condition, since participants read on the informed consent that 
they could win six euro after the ball drawn task, in the gain condition instructions sheet, 
the chance to win the money salient in the text was stressed. (See Appendix C) 
In the loss condition participants received the money immediately after reading the 
informed consent. To manipulate the frame, in the loss condition instructions sheet we 
make the money ownership salient in the text as well as the chance to lose that amount of 
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money after the ball drawn performance (See Appendix D). After reading the instruction, 
the participant performed the dice under the cup task. One dice roll was required, as well 
as two more rolls to verify the die legitimacy. 
After rolling the die, each participant reported the dice roll result on a decision sheet. 
Then they opened the door again and the experimenter took him/her in a different room. 
The experimenter explained that in according to what they reported, they had to pick up a 
white ball among other balls placed in a bowl. Beforehand, the experimenter filled the 
bowl with six yellow balls. Once the experimenter read the decision sheet outcome, she 
replaced the yellow balls with the number of white balls accordingly with the number 
reported on the decision sheet. Then the experimenter asked to participant to drawn a ball 
blindly. If they caught a white ball, they could keep the money. So then, if they cheated, 
the likelihood to kept/win the money got higher. 
Dependent Measure 
 The dice under the cup task is used to gather information regarding why people lie. So 
then, we analysed the total amount of cheating behaviours. Specifically, we compared the 
expected dice outcome frequency with the obtained one within the outcome uncertainty 
setting on the aggregate level.  
To investigate the role of the extrinsic attribution on the total amount of cheating, we 
analysed the obtained 4 and 5 dice outcome distribution. 
To investigate the role of the uncertainty avoidance on the total amount of cheating, we 
analysed the obtained 6 dice outcome distribution. 
To investigate the moderating effect of the frame, we compare the 4 and 5 as well as the 
6 dice outcome distributions in both frame conditions with the expected ones. 
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To investigate the interaction between the amount of cheating behaviors and the frame, a 
Chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the frequency of the observed 
dice outcomes with the expected dice outcome frequency within the outcome uncertainty 
setting. A non-significant value was found (2 (5) = 2.80, p =.731).  So then, there was 
no significant difference between the frequency of the observed dice outcomes and the 
expected dice outcome frequency. In other words, there was a no significant amount of 
cheating behaviors at a group level in both conditions.  
To test the interaction between the extrinsic attribution and the frame within the outcome 
uncertainty setting, we analyzed the 4 and 5 dice outcome distribution in both frame 
conditions. 
A Chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the frequency of 4 and 5 
dice outcome in the gain and loss frame. A slightly significant interaction was found (2 
(1) = 4,05 p < .05). Participants were more likely to report 4 and 5 (46,7%) in the gain 
frame rather than in the loss frame (38,7%). So then, the extrinsic attribution played a 
slightly significant role in the gain frame condition. 
 To test the interaction between the role of uncertainty avoidance mechanism and the 
frame within the outcome uncertainty setting, we analyzed the 6dice outcome 
distribution. 
A Chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the frequency of 6 dice 
outcome reported in the gain and loss frame. A non-significant interaction was found (2 
(1) = 2,08 p = .150). Participants were more likely to report 6 (17,3 %) in the loss frame 
rather than in the gain frame (9,3 %). So then, the uncertainty avoidance played a role in 
the loss frame, but it was not significant 
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In sum, results provide evidence for the idea that people do not lie as much as expected. 
Significant correlations 
A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between the 
attitudes toward free will, locus of control, fatal determination, and scientific 
determination. A positive correlation between free will and locus of control r = 0.361, n = 
148, p = 0.01 was found. Furthermore, a negative correlation between locus of control 
and fatal determination r = -.163, n = 148, p = 0.05 and a positive correlation between 
fatal determination and scientific determination r = 0.298, n = 148, p = 0.001 were found. 
To conclude, a slightly significant correlation between locus of control and scientific 
determination was found. r = 0.361, n = 148, p = 0.001. 
Conclusions 
The obtained results provide there are no significant differences between the expected die 
outcome distribution and the obtained one. Also, results provide that uncertainty 
avoidance did not play a significant role within outcome uncertainty, while extrinsic 
attribution played a slightly significant role in the gain frame condition. Suggestions for 
further research as well as limitations are provided.  
 
Discussion 
In the current study, we did not find the expected results from our predictions. 
We hypothesized that people are willing to adopt cheating behaviors to get a desired 
outcome within the outcome uncertainty. Specifically, we thought that two mechanism, 
extrinsic attribution and uncertainty avoidance played a significant role within the 
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outcome uncertainty. The activation of one mechanism rather than another interacted 
with the situational frame (gain frame vs loss frame). 
  Then, we set up a laboratory setting where recruited participants performed a 
probabilistic version of under the cup dice task paradigm. 
Results indicated that uncertainty avoidance did not play a significant role within 
outcome uncertainty, while extrinsic attribution played a slightly significant role in the 
gain frame.  
To conclude, people did not cheat as much as we expected. 
Limitations 
In the present study, several limitations might be affected the results. 
The first limitation is related to the sample size. We first fixed the sample size at 120 
participants but we later decided to expand it to 150 to get a higher effect. To test the role 
of the sample size, a new, larger one should be recommended. 
The second possible limitation concerns the role of social desirability. It would be 
possible that this factor might influenced the total amount of cheating behavior 
performed. 
Dalton and Ortegren (2011) hypothesized a relation between social desirability and 
gender. Specifically, the gender socialization theory supports the idea that females are 
more prone to experience the social desirability response bias (Chung and Monroe, 
2003). As main consequences of gender socialization process, women would be more 
concerned for the other wellbeing and would be more inclined to follow the societal 
norms to respond in a socially desirable way. (Barnett et al.1996; Chung and Monroe, 
2003). On the other hand, Smith and Oakley (1997) found that both men and women 
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responded in a similar way to ethical tasks which involves rules violations, such as 
cheating paradigm. Since our sample was composed mainly by women, the role of 
socialization might be influenced the results.  
The third possible limitation concerns how culture affects cheating behaviors in specific 
contexts. Our sample was mixed. We already review how culture can influence the 
amount of cheating behaviors in specific context situations. Also, the general tendencies 
toward dishonesty can be described in terms of personality traits (Fisman & Miguel, 
2007). We asked participants to complete a filler questionnaire and we did not assess the 
individual levels of dishonesty as well as the cultural internalization of dishonest act in 
specific context situations. 
Suggestions for future research 
To test again the hypotheses, we suggest new possible scenarios. 
First, a new higher sample size should be recommended. Since the under the dice cup 
paradigm has a high construct validity, we can keep the used experimental setting.  
Second, we should analyze the role of gender variable within the outcome distribution 
uncertainty. The effect of social desirability might interact with the extrinsic attribution 
and the uncertainty avoidance. Furthermore, we can also introduce a new under the dice 
version of the dice under the cup version to reduce the interaction between the 
experimenter and each participant. In the study conducted by Mann et al. (2016), they run 
an adopted version of the die under the cup task developed by Jiang (2013). In this 
version, the die task is performed through an I-pad and consist in rolling a virtual die over 
repeated trials. In each trial, participants were invited to choose a side of the die and then 
they were invited to remember their choice. Then, they were instructed to roll the die and 
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at the end of the die roll they should indicated what was the side they previously choose. 
Then participants are free to cheat indicated a different side of the die and gain the 
highest advantage. In fact, in this version the money outcome is proportional to the 
number of dots on the die side. 
Third we should asses the role of individual differences. In the current study, before 
starting the task, we asked to each participant to fill in a filler questionnaire. Instead of a 
questionnaire, we should consider new assessments, such as the role of individual 
differences. That might be another explanation for the unexpected results. 
 Halvey et al. (2014) assessed the relationship between the individual’s self-reported 
dishonesty and their actual dishonest behaviors. Specifically, in the Study 1 (Halvey, 
2014), they administered a lying frequency questionnaire (Serota et al., 2010) to each 
participant. The questionnaire did not have a high internal consistency, but due to the 
questionnaire nature, high internal consistency was not necessary. 
Lastly, we should assess if the internalized corruption, which as stated, influences 
context-specific cheating. Specifically, we could run a 10 to 15 minutes survey 
immediately before the experiment. This survey has already been adopted in the Mann et 
al (2016) and in the Garcia-Rada (2016) studies. In the survey, participants filled in how 
much they were likely to engage in dishonest behaviors in several life domains. They 
gathered information regarding the demographics of interest, such as age, gender, ethnic 
minority, annual earnings, religiosity levels and lack of trust.    
Since the individual levels of uncertainty avoidance seems to play a role within the 
frame, the development of a measure if the individual uncertainty avoidance level should 
be recommended. 
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Appendix A 
Gain Frame Informed Consent Form 
 
Thank you for participating in our study on uncertain events!   
  
In this experiment, you can win six Euro. Whether you win, will depend on a random 
ball draw. You will draw a ball out of a box that contains yellow and white balls. If you 
draw a yellow ball, you win € 6. If you draw a white ball, you win nothing. Before the 
ball draw you will first fill in a questionnaire.  
 
All your responses during this experiment will be anonymously coded and treated 
confidentially.  
You can stop at any time if you wish. If you any complaints, please contact dr. W. 
Steinel, wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
 
Please sign below to indicate that you understood and agree with this procedure. 
 
Leiden, __________________ 
 
 
Loss Frame Informed Consent Form 
 
Thank you for participating in our study on uncertain events!   
  
In this experiment, you get six Euro in cash. Whether you may keep this money, 
however, will depend on a random ball draw. You will draw a ball out of a box that 
contains yellow and white balls. If you draw a yellow ball, you may keep the € 6. If you 
draw a white ball, you lose the money. Before the ball draw you will first fill in a 
questionnaire. 
 
All your responses during this experiment will be anonymously coded and treated 
confidentially. You can stop at any time if you wish. If you any complaints, please 
contact dr. W. Steinel, wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
 
Please sign below to indicate that you understood and agree with this procedure. 
 
Leiden, __________________ 
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Appendix B 
Filler questionnaire 
Experiment: Uncertain Events   
Participant number: _____________ 
Please give us the following information about yourself  
I am a      □ Man 
□ Woman 
□ Different  or  I don’t want to tell 
 
I am ________ years old. 
 
How often have you participated in similar experiments at the Faculty of Social Sciences? 
□ Never: This is my first time 
□ Once before: This is the second experiment i participate in 
□ Twice before: This is the third experiment i participate in 
□ Three times before: This is the fourth experiment i participate in 
□ I have been participating in more than three experiments before 
 
How much do you agree with the following statements? strongly                     
strongly 
disagree                         
agree 
A job is what you make of it. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
On most jobs, people can pretty much accomplish whatever they set out to 
accomplish. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
If you know what you want out of a job, you can find a job that gives it to 
you. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
If employees are unhappy with a decision made by their boss, they should 
do something about it. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Getting the job you want is mostly a matter of luck. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Making money is primarily a matter of good fortune. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Most people are capable of doing their jobs well if they make the effort. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
In order to get a really good job you need to have family members or 
friends in high places. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Promotions are usually a matter of good fortune. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
When it comes to landing a really good job, who you know is more 
important than what you know. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Promotions are given to employees who perform well on the job. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
To make a lot of money you have to know the right people. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
It takes a lot of luck to be an outstanding employee on most jobs. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
People who perform their jobs well generally get rewarded for it. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Most employees have more influence on their supervisors than they think 1     2     3     4     5     6 
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they do. 
The main difference between people who make a lot of money and people 
who make a little money is luck. 1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
Please turn over. 
How much do you agree with the following statements? strongly                
strongly 
disagree                    
agree 
I believe that the future has already been determined by fate. 1     2     3     4     5 
People’s biological makeup determines their talents and personality. 1     2     3     4     5 
Chance events seem to be the major cause of human history. 1     2     3     4     5 
People have complete control over the decisions they make. 1     2     3     4     5 
No matter how hard you try, you can’t change your destiny. 1     2     3     4     5 
Psychologists and psychiatrists will eventually figure out all human behavior. 1     2     3     4     5 
No one can predict what will happen in this world. 1     2     3     4     5 
People must take full responsibility for any bad choices they make. 1     2     3     4     5 
Fate already has a plan for everyone. 1     2     3     4     5 
Your genes determine your future. 1     2     3     4     5 
Life seems unpredictable—just like throwing dice or flipping a coin. 1     2     3     4     5 
People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to. 1     2     3     4     5 
Whatever will be, will be—there’s not much you can do about it. 1     2     3     4     5 
Science has shown how your past environment created your current 
intelligence and personality. 1     2     3     4     5 
People are unpredictable. 1     2     3     4     5 
Criminals are totally responsible for the bad things they do. 1     2     3     4     5 
Whether people like it or not, mysterious forces seem to move their lives. 1     2     3     4     5 
As with other animals, human behavior always follows the laws of nature. 1     2     3     4     5 
Life is hard to predict because it is almost totally random. 1     2     3     4     5 
Luck plays a big role in people’s lives. 1     2     3     4     5 
People have complete free will. 1     2     3     4     5 
Parents’ character will determine the character of their children. 1     2     3     4     5 
People are always at fault for their bad behavior. 1     2     3     4     5 
Childhood environment will determine your success as an adult. 1     2     3     4     5 
What happens to people is a matter of chance. 1     2     3     4     5 
Strength of mind can always overcome the body’s desires. 1     2     3     4     5 
People’s futures cannot be predicted. 1     2     3     4     5 
 
When I am in conflict with someone else, the BEST outcome for me occurs when:  
□ I behave competitively and they behave cooperatively. □  
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□ We both behave cooperatively. □  
 
When I am in conflict with someone else, the WORST outcome for me occurs when:  
□ I behave cooperatively and they behave competitively. □  
□ We both behave competitively. □  
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Appendix C 
Instructions and decision sheet: gain frame in English 
 
Instructions 
 
Please read the instructions entirely and carefully. 
 
In this experiment, your payoff will depend upon your decisions. All your decisions will 
be anonymous. You will indicate your decisions on a decision sheet that will be given by 
the experimenter during the experiment. There is no good nor bad answer.  
From now and until the end of the experiment, we ask you to remain silent. If you have 
any questions, open the door and the experimenter will come to answer your questions 
privately. 
General framework of the experiment 
 
In this experiment, you can win a prize of €6. There will be 6 coloured balls, either white 
or yellow, which are placed into a bowl. You have to randomly draw one ball which 
determines whether you win €6. If the ball you draw is yellow you win €6; if the ball you 
draw is white you win nothing. At the beginning of the experiment, there are 6 white 
balls in the bowl. The number of yellow balls that will replace these white balls depends 
on your dice roll. 
Before randomly drawing a ball, you will have to roll a regular, six face dice. More 
precisely, you have an opaque cup with a cover. The small hole located in the cover 
allows you to see the dice. You must shake the cup to throw the dice. Then put it down 
and, without moving the cup, take a look through the hole to observe the outcome of your 
throw. The number displayed by the dice will determine the number of yellow balls that 
will replace the white balls in the bowl (the decision sheet indicates the number of yellow 
and white balls according to each possible outcome of the dice). 
The first roll will determine the number of yellow balls located in the bowl. After the first 
roll, we ask that you roll the dice under the cup 2 more times so that you can verify for 
yourself that the dice is legitimate.  
Open the door after you are done reading these instructions, then the experimenter will 
give you a “decision sheet” as well as the cup so you can roll the dice. After rolling the 
dice three times, tick on the “decision sheet” the number displayed by the first roll. Leave 
the cup next to the computer. Give the decision sheet to the experimenter, so the 
experimenter can prepare the draw (i.e., replace as many white balls by yellow ones as 
the number you have rolled in the first dice roll), then you may randomly draw a ball 
from the bowl. If this ball you draw is yellow you receive €6 and sign for receiving the 
money. If the ball you draw is white you will receive no money.  
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Decision sheet 
 
Number displayed 
by the dice 
Number of yellow 
balls 
Number of white 
balls 
Prize (if a yellow 
ball is drawn) 
Tick the number 
rolled (X) 
1 1 5 €6  
2 2 4 €6  
3 3 3 €6  
4 4 2 €6  
5 5 1 €6  
6 6 0 €6  
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Instruction and decision sheet gain in dutch 
 
Instructies 
Lees de instructies volledig en nauwkeurig door.  
 
Het bedrag wat je in dit experiment kunt verdienen hangt volledig af van je eigen 
beslissingen. Al je beslissingen zijn anoniem  en niet bekend bij de proefleider. Je wordt 
gevraagd om je beslissingen aan te geven in de beslissingstabel, die je later tijdens het 
experiment zult ontvangen van de proefleider. Er zijn hierbij geen goede of foute 
beslissingen.  
 
Vanaf nu tot het einde van het experiment willen we je vragen of stil te blijven. Als je 
vragen hebt kan je de deur openen en zal de proefleider je vraag privé beantwoorden.                                                 
 
Experiment 
Tijdens dit experiment kan je €6 winnen. Er zullen 6 gekleurde balletjes, wit of geel, in 
een bak gestopt worden. Je zult gevraagd worden om één bal te pakken, zonder dat je ziet 
welke kleur deze heeft. Als de bal geel is win je €6; als de bal wit is win je niks. Aan het 
begin van het experiment zullen er 6 witte ballen in de bak zitten. Het aantal gele ballen 
dat de witte ballen zal vervangen hangt af van het aantal ogen dat je gooit met een 
dobbelsteen.  
 
Voordat je straks een bal pakt uit de bak, rol je dus eerst een dobbelsteen. Dit is een 
gewone dobbelsteen met 6 zijden. Deze dobbelsteen bevindt zich in een papieren beker 
die is afgedekt. In deze afdekking zit een gat, zodat je kunt zien wat je hebt gegooid. Om 
de dobbelsteen te rollen schud je de beker om de beker vervolgens neer te zetten. Zonder 
de beker te bewegen, kijk je door het gaatje in de afdekking van de beker om te zien wat 
je hebt gegooid. Het aantal ogen dat je hebt gegooid wordt het aantal gele ballen dat de 
witte ballen zal vervangen in de bak. (in de beslissingstabel kun je zien welk aantal ogen 
zorgt voor de verdeling in witte en gele ballen).  
 
Het aantal ogen dat je de eerste keer gooit met de dobbelsteen is het aantal witte ballen 
dat vervangen wordt door gele ballen. Vervolgens vragen we je de dobbelsteen nog 
tweemaal te gooien om voor jezelf vast te stellen dat de dobbelsteen goed werkt.  
 
Als je klaar bent met het lezen van deze instructies mag je de deur opendoen. De 
proefleider brengt je de beker met de dobbelsteen en de beslissingstabel. Nadat je de 
dobbelsteen drie keer hebt gegooid vragen we je in de beslissingstabel het gegooide 
aantal ogen van de eerste rol aan te kruisen. Je kunt de beker naast de computer zetten. 
Open de deur en geef de beslissingstabel aan de proefleider, zodat de proefleider de bak 
met ballen kan klaarmaken. De proefleider zal terugkomen met de bak waaruit je, zonder 
te kijken, een bal mag pakken.  
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Beslissingstabel 
 
Aantal ogen op de 
dobbelsteen 
 
Aantal gele ballen Aantal witte 
ballen 
Als je een gele bal 
pakt win je: 
Kruis het aantal 
ogen aan (X) 
1 
 
1 5 €6  
2 
 
2 4  €6  
3 
 
3 3 €6  
4 
 
4 2  €6  
5 
 
5 1  €6  
6 
 
6 0 -€6  
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Appendix D 
Instruction and decision sheet: loss frame in English 
 
Instructions 
 
Please read the instructions entirely and carefully. 
 
In this experiment, your payoff will depend upon your decisions. All your decisions will 
be anonymous. You will indicate your decisions on a decision sheet that will be given by 
the experimenter during the experiment. There is no good nor bad answer.  
From now and until the end of the experiment, we ask you to remain silent. If you have 
any questions, open the door and the experimenter will come to answer your questions 
privately. 
General framework of the experiment 
 
You just received €6 which is now yours. In this experiment 6 coloured balls, either 
white or yellow, will be placed into a bowl. You have to randomly draw one ball which 
determines whether you lose your €6. If the ball you draw is yellow you may keep your 
€6; if the ball you draw is white you lose your money and you need to hand in your €6. 
At the beginning of the experiment, there will be 6 white balls in the bowl. The number 
of yellow balls that will replace these white balls depends on your dice roll. 
Before randomly drawing a ball, you will have to roll a regular, six face dice. More 
precisely, you have an opaque cup with a cover. The small hole located in the cover 
allows you to see the dice. You must shake the cup to throw the dice. Then put it down 
and, without moving the cup, take a look through the hole to observe the outcome of your 
throw. The number displayed by the dice will determine the number of yellow balls that 
will replace the white balls in the bowl (the decision sheet indicates the number of yellow 
and white balls according to each possible outcome of the dice). 
The first roll will determine the number of yellow balls located in the bowl. After the first 
roll, we ask that you roll the dice under the cup 2 more times so that you can verify for 
yourself that the dice is legitimate.  
Open the door after you are done reading these instructions, then the experimenter will 
give you a "decision sheet" as well as the cup so you can roll the dice. After rolling the 
dice three times, tick on the "decision sheet" the number displayed by the first roll. Leave 
the cup next to the computer. Give the decision sheet to the experimenter, so the 
experimenter can prepare the draw (i.e., replace as many white balls by yellow ones as 
the number you have rolled in the first dice roll), then you may randomly draw a ball 
from the bowl. If this ball you draw is yellow you keep your €6 and sign for the money. 
If the ball you draw is white you will have to give your €6 to the experimenter.  
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Decision sheet 
 
Number displayed 
by the dice 
Number of yellow 
balls 
Number of white 
balls 
You will lose (if a 
white ball is 
drawn) 
Tick the number 
rolled (X) 
1 1 5 - €6  
2 2 4 - €6  
3 3 3 - €6  
4 4 2 - €6  
5 5 1 - €6  
6 6 0 - €6  
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Instruction and decision sheet loss frame dutch 
 
Instructies 
Lees de instructies volledig en nauwkeurig door.  
 
Het bedrag wat je in dit experiment kunt verdienen hangt volledig af van je eigen 
beslissingen. Al je beslissingen zijn anoniem en niet bekend bij de proefleider. Je wordt 
gevraagd om je beslissingen aan te geven in de beslissingstabel, die je later tijdens het 
experiment zult ontvangen van de proefleider. Er zijn hierbij geen goede of foute 
beslissingen.  
 
Vanaf nu tot het einde van het experiment willen we je vragen of stil te blijven. Als je 
vragen hebt kan je de deur openen en zal de proefleider je vraag privé beantwoorden.                                                 
 
Experiment 
Je hebt zojuist €6 ontvangen wat nu van jou is. Tijdens dit experiment zullen er 6 
gekleurde balletjes, wit of geel, in een bak gestopt worden. Je zult gevraagd worden om 
één bal te pakken, zonder dat je ziet welke kleur deze heeft. Als de bal geel is mag je je 
€6 houden; als de bal wit is moet je je €6 inleveren. Aan het begin van het experiment 
zullen er 6 witte ballen in de bak zitten. Het aantal gele ballen dat de witte ballen zal 
vervangen hangt af van het aantal ogen dat je gooit met een dobbelsteen. 
 
Voordat je straks een bal pakt uit de bak, rol je dus eerst een dobbelsteen. Dit is een 
gewone dobbelsteen met 6 zijden. Deze dobbelsteen bevindt zich in een papieren beker 
die is afgedekt. In deze afdekking zit een gat, zodat je kunt zien wat je hebt gegooid. Om 
de dobbelsteen te rollen schud je de beker om de beker vervolgens neer te zetten. Zonder 
de beker te bewegen, kijk je door het gaatje in de afdekking van de beker om te zien wat 
je hebt gegooid. Het aantal ogen dat je hebt gegooid wordt het aantal gele ballen dat de 
witte ballen zal vervangen in de bak. (in de beslissingstabel kun je zien welk aantal ogen 
zorgt voor de verdeling in witte en gele ballen).  
 
Het aantal ogen dat je de eerste keer gooit met de dobbelsteen is het aantal witte ballen 
dat vervangen wordt door gele ballen. Vervolgens vragen we je de dobbelsteen nog 
tweemaal te gooien om voor jezelf vast te stellen dat de dobbelsteen goed werkt.  
 
Als je klaar bent met het lezen van deze instructies mag je de deur opendoen. De 
proefleider brengt je de beker met de dobbelsteen en de beslissingstabel. Nadat je de 
dobbelsteen drie keer hebt gegooid vragen we je in de beslissingstabel het gegooide 
aantal ogen van de eerste rol aan te kruisen. Je kunt de beker naast de computer zetten. 
Open de deur en geef de beslissingstabel aan de proefleider, zodat de proefleider de bak 
met ballen kan klaarmaken. De proefleider zal terugkomen met de bak waaruit je, zonder 
te kijken, een bal mag pakken.  
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Beslissingstabel 
 
Aantal ogen op de 
dobbelsteen 
 
Aantal gele ballen Aantal witte 
ballen 
Als je een witte bal 
pakt verlies je: 
Kruis het aantal 
ogen aan (X) 
1 
 
1 5 - €6  
2 
 
2 4 - €6  
3 
 
3 3 - €6  
4 
 
4 2 - €6  
5 
 
5 1 - €6  
6 
 
6 0 - €6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
